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TRUTH COMMISSION IMPACT:
A PARTICIPATION-BASED
IMPLEMENTATION AGENDA
Tara J. Melish*
INTRODUCTION
The growth in the transitional justice literature over the last decade has
been exponential,' a trend mirroring the increased frequency with which
global actors deploy an expanding range of transitional justice mecha-
nisms, 2 including truth commissions, 3 trials, 4 reparation,5 amnesties, 6 vet-
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY Buffalo
Law School, The State University of New York.
1. See, e.g., Andrew G. Reiter, compiler, Transitional Justice Bibliography, http://
sites.google.com/site/transitionaljusticedatabase/transitional-justice-bibiliography (iden-
tifying over 2,300 articles and books in the field). As used here, transitional justice
refers to "that set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of
conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing
with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law." Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The
New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006).
2. Ruti Teitel observes that the twenty-first century has brought a "steady state"
phase, in which transitional justice has moved from the exception to the norm, having
become a paradigm of rule of law. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 71 (2003); see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Foreward, in ASSESS-
ING THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH vii
(Hugo Van der Merwe et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter ASSESSING TJ IMPACT] (observing
that recourse to transitional justice has become "almost routine").
3. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 6 (2d ed. 2011) (documenting increased fre-
quency of use of truth commissions).
4. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: How HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECU-
TIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011) (referring to increased frequency with
which transitional states pursue criminal prosecutions over amnesties as a "justice cas-
cade," in which prosecutions become the new global norm). Others have nonetheless
questioned the thesis that international justice norms have reduced the adoption of
amnesties following democratic transitions, observing that while the raw number of
prosecutions has risen steadily over the past decade, the ratio of trials and amnesties to
democratic transitions has remained constant. See TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 99 (2010)
(concluding rate of accountability over time has actually fallen from its peak in the mid-
1970s)
5. See The HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Grief ed., at 2006) (compiling
important set of post-conflict national experiences with reparations programs).
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ting and lustration, 7 memorialization,8 and other increasingly community-
based initiatives. 9 The use of truth commissions in particular has become
so prevalent that "it is difficult to conjure an example of a political or post-
conflict transition (since the 1990s) in which the idea of establishing a truth
commission has been overlooked."' 0
An important core of the transitional justice scholarship has corre-
spondingly centered on assessing the relative effectiveness of truth commis-
sions and other transitional justice mechanisms, both within and across
societies. Encompassing vastly different perspectives, it has comprised at
least four identifiable approaches to assessing "impact" or "success."'"I Each
has added important and complementary insights to the field. Nonetheless,
each has also exhibited important weaknesses in its ability to speak persua-
sively to the question of meaningful long-term impact on the societal dy-
namics and institutions that lead to violence in the first place. I attribute
these limitations to the general sidelining in such approaches of attention to
the engagement dynamics that surround a transitional justice mechanism,
particularly after it completes its mandate. How does broader society en-
gage with the processes, outputs, and work product of such mechanisms,
including in particular the final report and formal policy recommendations
of truth commissions?
This Essay proposes a new more process-oriented research agenda for
measuring the impact of transitional justice mechanisms that more directly
takes these engagement and implementation factors into account. Such an
6. See Louise Mallinder, Can Amnesties and International Justice Be Reconciled?
I INT'L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2007) (introducing Amnesty Law Database present-
ing descriptions and analysis of over 500 amnesty laws promulgated since WWII).
7. See, e.g., JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSI-
TIONAL SOCIETIES (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007) (exploring
comparative practices through which abusive or corrupt employees are excluded from
public office).
8. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN BREIr' ET AL., MEMORIALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY:
STATE POLICY AND CIVIC ACTION (2008) (gathering experiences with how public me-
morials and sites of conscience can stimulate civic engagement and shape cultures of
democracy).
9. See, e.g., LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES
AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf, eds. 2010) [hereinafter Lo-
CALIZING TJ]; TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., 2008) [hereinafter
TJ FROM BELOW].
10. MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 11
(2006).
11. I refer to these as "Quantifiable Truth," "Victim Perception," "Formal Political
Rights," and "Redistributive Development." See Part II infra.
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agenda, I argue, not only is better able to reflect the inherent limitations of
transitional justice mechanisms as short-term institutions, but better cap-
tures the key purposes for which they are created. It is thus an important
and necessary complement to current approaches favored in the literature.
With a focus on truth commissions, the Essay proceeds in four parts.
Part I introduces some of the key desiderata for assessing truth commission
impact, suggesting why a shift to the broader social dynamics and political
processes of implementation is warranted. It proposes a new set of metrics
or methodological indicators to help guide assessments of truth commission
impact. Part II places these metrics in context by reviewing the current state
of research in the field; it highlights the four dominant approaches used
today to assess impact or success, and notes their major weaknesses. Part III
addresses how the proposed metrics respond to some of these weaknesses
and hence are better able to capture the key objectives of transitional jus-
tice. I identify these as norm reconstruction, civic reengagement, and struc-
tural-institutional reform, each equally necessary for ensuring the
overarching goal of transitional justice: preventing the recurrence of past
violence and abuse. Part IV concludes with final observations.
I. ASSESSING IMPACT
What are the primary goals truth commissions aim to achieve? Clarity
around such objectives is of course necessary for identifying the relevant
metrics or indicators for assessing a commission's effectiveness or "suc-
cess." A wide range of objectives have correspondingly been identified.
Neil Kritz identifies truth, justice, democratic reform and durable peace as
the "four basic objectives of any transitional justice program," and hence
"the standards by which all transitional justice policies should be evalu-
ated."' 12 Others have spotlighted "reconciliation" as the overarching aim, a
term whose definition has nonetheless proved highly elusive. With no com-
monly accepted content, either among scholars or distinct transitional com-
munities, it has come to assume "multiple meanings and understandings"
among distinct constituencies over the last twenty years. 13 This lack of
shared meaning has created significant difficulties for using "reconcilia-
tion" as a meaningful metric for determining the impact or success of a
truth commission. The same is true for other commonly cited transitional
justice goals, particularly "truth," "justice," and "peace," all of which as-
12. See, e.g., Neil Kritz, Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transi-
tional Justice, in ASSESSING TJ IMPACT, supra note 2, at 13, 13.
13. See, e.g., RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST CONFLICT SOCI-
ETIES 5, 12, 290 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (compiling essays championing competing
definitions of reconciliation).
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sume a wide variety of meanings for different social constituencies and
stakeholders. 14
This Essay proposes taking a step back to spotlight attention on a more
overarching and concrete framework objective of transitional justice:
preventing the recurrence of past violence and abuse.15 How does society
organize itself to transform the underlying norms, structures, conditions,
behaviors, and relationships of power that allowed violence and human
rights abuse to occur in the first place? It is only through such broadly
understood transformation, conceptualized as a long-term, multi-layered
process of active and creative stakeholder engagement and self re-creation,
that a return to the past can effectively be ensured against. A focus on the
societal transformations necessary for prevention-measured by outcome,
process and structural indicators-thus serves as a better metric for "suc-
cess" in the work of truth commissions and other transitional justice mecha-
nisms, I would contend, than do other more limited or contested standards,
such as "truth," "reconciliation," "peace," or "justice."'16 By maintaining a
forward-looking, instrumental, and engagement-centered perspective on
transition, such a metric likewise has the advantage of not conflating suc-
cess with the mere absence of fighting or a thin retributive or restorative
model that seeks merely to return victims to the status quo ante.' 7 Rather, it
aims to ensure that the focus of analysis and assessment in the transitional
context remains tightly focused on how transitional justice mechanisms
contribute in fact to the much more complex social and institutional interac-
tions and engagements that are necessary to prevent similar abuses from
occurring in the future.
The centrality of prevention as an overarching goal of transitional jus-
tice has indeed repeatedly been conveyed in the titles of truth commission
14. See, e.g., Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE
RES. 167 (1969) (discussing different definitions of the word "peace" often used by
researchers).
15. As Priscilla Hayner observes, "[p]erhaps the most important aim of any truth
commission should be to prevent further violence and rights abuses in the future." HAY-
NER, supra note 3, at 182.
16. Indeed, it is for the purpose of preventing further abuse that mechanisms to
establish truth, justice, reconciliation, and democratic reform are created, the latter be-
ing means for achieving the primary end of prevention and non-recurrence.
17. Contrasted with narrower retributive and restorative models of justice, this
approach is sometimes referred to as "transformative justice," understood as a paradigm
working not to restore a harmony that never existed, but to create a new equilibrium
where social exploitation, marginalization and disenfranchisement are overcome.
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reports: "Nunca Mds," "Nunca Mais," or "Never Again."' 18 It is likewise
emphasized in the opening statements and guiding purposes of virtually all
truth commission reports.19 It may even be reflected in the very definition
of a truth commission.2 0 Dr. Theresa Chun, a victim-survivor of the Korean
War, echoes the sentiment in this Issue, lamenting the need to continue to
talk after-the-fact, time and again, about "[t]ruth and reconciliation and rep-
arations." The primary goal is: "how do we make it not happen in the first
place?" 21
And, yet, the evidence is questionable that nations that sponsor truth
commission processes are in fact any more democratic, stable, respectful of
18. See, for example, the (state, church, and civil society-sponsored) truth com-
mission reports from Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay. NUNCA
MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED
(1984); BRASIL: NUNCA MAIS (1985) (report of the Archdiocese of Sdo Paulo); GUATE-
MALA: NUNCA MAS (1998) (report of the Recovery of Historical Memory Project of the
Catholic Church's Human Rights Office (REMHI)); PARAGUAY: NUNCA MAs (1990)
(report of the Committee of Churches for Emergency Assistance (CIPAE)); URUGUAY
NUNCA MAs: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, 1972-1985 (1992) (report of the Peace and
Justice Service (SERPAJ)).
19. See, e.g., WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND REC-
ONCILIATION COMMISSION 7, 1 (2004) ("It is only through generating such understand-
ing that the horrors of the past can effectively be prevented from occurring again");
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, COMPREHENSIVE RE-
PORT, VOL. 1, at 56 (2010) (recognizing commission mandate to "take steps to prevent
such incidents from recurring") [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE REPORT]. See also OFFICE
OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE-OF-LAw TOOLS FOR POST-
CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS 2 (2006) (emphasizing objective of truth com-
missions to "prevent further abuses" through specific recommendations for institutional
and policy reforms).
20. Mark Freeman defines a truth commission as:
an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in and
authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on
the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of
severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods
of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and
future prevention.
FREEMAN, supra note 10, at 18 (emphasis added). See also HAYNER, supra note 3, at 11
(recognizing as part of what defines a truth commission its intention "to address the past
in order to change policies, practices, and even relationships in the future").
21. Dr. Theresa Chun, A Survivor's Testimony: Closing Remarks to the Confer-
ence on "Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Lessons for Korea," 19
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73 (2012). As Dr. Chun insists, we must work to ensure that
"other persons do not die like my brother and other families won't be like our family
and myself." Id.
2012]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
human rights, or likely to avoid a renewed outbreak of violence, internal
conflict or repressive activity. Many societies are left deeply disappointed,
even disillusioned, at the close of a truth commission's mandate, especially
as it becomes clear that the government has little will to implement the
commission's recommendations for victim redress and institutional re-
form.22 Although there are individual examples where democratic reforms
and a better human rights record follow upon truth and reconciliation
processes, recent studies suggest that these examples may be outliers and
that there is little, if any, direct correlation between truth commission
processes and societal transformation. 23
What accounts for this lack of impact? Many factors may credibly be
posited. The very depth of dysfunction or divisionalism in many transitional
societies may surely contribute.24 A lack of local interest in pursuing the
past as a useful response to mass atrocity may also be a factor,25 as may
22. See Kritz, supra note 12, at 17 (noting frustration created by "enormous chasm
between ... the wonderful mandates to develop detailed recommendations, directed at
all sectors, on major societal reforms . . . and . . . the virtual dismissal, or at least
nonimplementation, of these recommendations by the governments that receive them").
23. See ERIC WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL SO-
CIETIES: THE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY (2010) (concluding negative
impact based on statistical regression analysis, but pointing to four case studies of posi-
tive correlation); OLSEN ET AL., supra note 4 (concluding that truth commissions pro-
duce negative impacts on a nation's human rights and democracy outcomes when
pursued in isolation, but positive impacts when pursued in combination with trials and
amnesties); Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragma-
tism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5 (2003) (concluding that
truth commissions may be irrelevant or harmful unless employed in countries well on
the road to democracy and, even then, may mask the real facilitators of peace by provid-
ing political cover for amnesties; properly designed and enforced amnesties do a better
job of ending civil wars, and encouraging human rights, democracy and the rule of law).
24. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in
Times of Transition, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23 (2008) (noting depth of divisions
in former Yugoslavia as preventing any common understanding of "truth"). The same
conclusions have been reached regarding the truth-telling functions of international
criminal law. See Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of
an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 463, 476-77
(2009) ("truth" still disputed); Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International
Criminal Justice, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 329, 336-37 (2008).
25. See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 3, at 196-198 (noting Mozambique, where local
population has rejected processes of investigating the past in favor of social practice of
"forgetting"); ROSALIND SHAW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND RECON-
CILIATION COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE 9 (2005) (noting longstanding
Sierra Leoneon practice of social forgetting as mechanism used to "cool the heart" and
reestablish the community).
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design failures in the assigned mandate, powers, or even choice of a truth
commission. 26 A simpler, more generalizable rationale may nevertheless be
the most compelling explanation: Truth commissions, no matter how struc-
tured, cannot by themselves transform society. As short-term institutions
with only weak investigatory powers, they can merely begin processes, act
as enablers, and sow seeds of transformation, providing important tools or
resources for leveraging behavioral change in recalcitrant institutions and
social relationships. 27 To effect real change or transformation, these tools
must be taken up by broader civil society and institutional actors.
Too often, however, the transitional justice literature adopts easy and
comfortable, even complacent, assumptions about what truth commissions
can accomplish to guide assessments of their success. 28 These assumptions
take certain major conclusions for granted. One is that a definitive account-
ing of dark, hidden, and complex pasts can in fact be achieved over the
course of a truth commission's mandate, short, circumscribed and politi-
cally compromised as it is.29 Perhaps more importantly, they presuppose a
direct causal connection between truth-telling and the broader goals of tran-
sitional justice, uncritically concluding that the public airing of truths about
the past will in fact bring about institutional learning, official acknowledg-
26. See, e.g., Kim Dong-Choon, Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
An Overview and Assessment, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97 (2012) (focusing on
design failures in mandate and powers of truth commission); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, De-
signing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach, I MIcH. J. INT'L
L. 1, 3 (2010) (highlighting importance of surveying local perception in decisions re-
garding which transitional justice mechanism to pursue); Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Social Reconstruction as a Local Process, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 152,
157-58 (2008) (observing that truth commissions have strengths and weaknesses that
make them appropriate for some societies recovering from mass violence and inappro-
priate for others).
27. These tools include, for example, detailed investigative reports regarding par-
ticular incidents, lists of victims, the identification of patterns of institutional conduct
and responsibilities, the exhumation of graves, a set of causal narratives, and a list of
specific recommendations to the state and other actors for additional steps to be taken
moving forward.
28. HAYNER, supra note 3, at 4 ("Many comfortable assumptions [about what a
process of truth-seeking is and what it might lead to] have been restated over and again
in untested assertions by otherwise astute and careful writers, thinkers, and political
leaders.").
29. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 25, at 3 (observing that it is "deeply problematic
for a national commission to produce a single 'impartial' historical record-a definitive
national memory-and to expect it to command agreement and heal social divisions");
Tristram Hunt, Whose Truth? Objective Truth and a Challenge for History, 15 CRIM.
L.F. 193 (2004).
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ment, and social healing, causing victims and perpetrators to come together
in reconciliation and forgiveness. That is, they presume a natural, even in-
evitable, progression from truth to reconciliation to the institutional re-
forms, social healing, and civic reengagements necessary to prevent future
violations.30
These suppositions are implicit in many, if not most, truth commission
initiatives. South Africa, for example, celebrated its truth commission under
the banner "Truth: The Road to Reconciliation."'" South Korea, too, has
pursued a policy of "reconciliation through truth. '32 As former commis-
sioner Kim Dong-Choon has noted, the act establishing Korea's truth and
reconciliation commission neither defined reconciliation nor identified how
it was to be achieved, including by or between whom; rather, the assump-
tion underlying the body's mandate was that "reconciliation" and "national
legitimacy" would follow automatically from establishing the "truth" of the
past.3
3
Truth, however, no matter how comprehensive or impartial, can never
by itself achieve the ends of transitional justice. Its role is far more instru-
mental. In particular, while its recognition can serve important dignitary
ends for victims and their families, its primary role may be as a process
predicate, opening the door to a far broader set of reconciliatory, recon-
structive, and democracy-enhancing initiatives in larger society.34 By open-
ing processes for truth-telling, a commission may, for example, make it safe
30. The fallacy of these easy connections has been pointed out in an increasing
number of analyses. See, e.g., David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and
Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT'L STUDIES REV. 355 (2004)
(examining core assumptions in literature about what truth commissions do); Jeremy
Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transi-
tional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 661 (2004) (same).
31. KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF
APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE 9-11 (1996). For critiques of this connection,
see, for example, COMMISSIONING THE PAST: UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson eds., 2002).
32. Kim Dong-Choon, supra note 26, at 102 (emphasis added).
33. Id.; see also Kang Hyun-kyung, Ahn Unveils 3 Steps for Forgiveness, Recon-
ciliation, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009 (quoting President of TRCK as saying "To move
on, our society needs to offer a sincere apology to those victims so that they can accept
it and forgive what the past regimes did to them. We will be able to remove the hurdle
as mutual recognition will naturally lead to reconciliation") (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Social Repair at the Local
Level: The Case of Guatemala, in TJ FROM BELOW, supra note 9, at 143, 158-64 (docu-
menting community-based truth-telling, cleansing, memorialization, and dispute resolu-
tion initiatives that followed Guatemala's deployment of national-level truth
commissions).
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to talk openly about the past, stimulating new truth-telling projects that
bring in far more facts, complexities, perspectives, and experiences.3 5 By
compiling lists of names of victims whose cases have been verified, truth
commissions may open the possibility of payment of often significant repa-
rations to thousands of victims or families, as has been the case in Argen-
tina, Chile, and Morocco. 36 Their documentation work may likewise lead to
important prosecutions, even when such prosecutions would not have been
possible at the time the commission functioned. 37 And, a commission's re-
port may receive a great amount of attention, making it more difficult to
question the fact that the state was responsible for grossly abusive prac-
tices. 38 Perhaps most importantly, the process of truth telling may be taken
up by local actors as a tool for conscientization and movement building.
In this latter regard, truth commissions serve a critical instrumental
function by using their investigations to lay out a series of specific policy
recommendations for the government and other relevant actors to take for-
ward, 39 sometimes accompanied by a mandatory implementation proviso. 40
35. See, e.g., id. at 158-59 (discussing locally-based Historial for Peace truth-tell-
ing initiatives in Guatemala); Jeon Seung-Hee, War Trauma, Memories, and Truths:
Representations of the Korean War in Pak Wan-so's Writings and in "Still Present
Pasts," 42 CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIEs 623, 624 (2010) (discussing "Still Present Pasts"
truth-telling initiative on the experiences and intergenerational impacts of the Korean
War); Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance,
New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 79-83 (2010) (discussing 1998 South African Poverty Hearings,
designed to provide a platform for victims of apartheid's structural violence to tell their
stories and to help shape policymaking as a supplement to the more formalized and
narrowly-mandated Truth and Reconciliation Commission). See also www.povertyini-
tiative.org/tcscotland (describing similar initiative in Scotland).
36. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 167-173.
37. Id. at 93-97 (highlighting experiences of Argentina, Peru and Chad, although
noting that decision to pursue trials is generally the result of multiple factors outside of
a commission's control).
38. In early 2012 in South Korea, for example, the ruling Saenuri Party withdrew
its selection of two candidates for National Assembly elections amid growing criticism
of their alleged "distortion of modem Korean history" and their seemingly inappropriate
comments on historic events. One of those candidates was a former TRCK Chair who
had sought to ban distribution of a TRCK report and insisted that two historic civic
movements were acts of illegitimate violence. See Lee Tae-hoon, Ruling Party Cancels
Ex-Truth Commission Chiefs Candidacy, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012
39. See FREEMAN, supra note 10, at 18 (incorporating issuance of specific reform
recommendations into very definition of a truth commission).
40. El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and South Korea are examples. See HAY-
NER, supra note 3, at 191-93 (highlighting experiences of El Salvador, Sierra Leone,
and Liberia, while recognizing latter's "show cause" provision for non-compliance);
2012]
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These recommendations are not dispositive of future directions, but they
can serve as key leverage for taking forward the broader transitional justice
project, allowing civil society actors to take ownership of it and develop it
contextually in appropriate and homegrown ways. Without these responsive
initiatives, undertaken in parallel at natipnal, community, and inter-individ-
ual levels, truth commissions and their formal outputs are unlikely to have
much, if any, meaningful impact on the attitudes, behaviors, norm systems,
and institutional relationships that allowed abuse to occur in the first place.
This is both because circumstances on the ground vary widely, requiring
tailored responses both within and across societies to address local contin-
gencies, power relationships, and other relational complexities, and because
formal transitional justice mechanisms promoted "from above" are often
captured or manipulated by political elites to serve their own interests and
agendas. 4 1
And, yet, when a truth commission's term comes to an end and the
story it has told is incomplete, when individuals and communities continue
to feel pain and resentment, or when perpetrators are not brought to account
and institutions not reformed, critics inevitably tend to call foul. They
blame the inadequacy of the truth commission or the obstinacy of govern-
ment.42 Some will see the commission as a political white-wash-a tool
pursued by the government to gain international legitimacy by showing for-
eign counterparts that it "cares about human rights," while doing nothing to
implement real change at home. The resulting discontent and political disil-
lusionment with the associated transitional justice project may in fact com-
Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation, Law No.
7542, May 31, 2005, art. 32.5 [hereinafter Framework Act], reprinted in TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: Ac-
TIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 115, 124 (2009) ("The related entities receiving any
recommendation under paragraph 4 shall respect and attempt to implement the pro-
posed recommendations.") (emphasis added).
41. On this latter point, see Elizabeth Stanley, The Political Economy of Transi-
tional Justice in Timor-Leste, in TJ FROM BELOW, supra note 9, at 167; Catalina Diaz,
Challenging Impunity from Below: The Contested Ownership of Transitional Justice in
Colombia, in TJ FROM BELOW, supra note 9, at 189; John Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Lessons from the Cambodian Experience with Truth and Reconciliation, 19
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193 (2012).
42. Of course, both of these may be true. A truth commission can always be de-
signed to have stronger, broader, or more defined powers. Its mandate might profitably
have been extended, broadened, or even narrowed. Likewise, the government may have
little incentive to take up a truth commission's recommendations or to take any further
reform measure. In many cases, as in the South Korean example, it will claim that it is
time to stop looking backward and focus instead on the future.
[Vol. 19
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pound social divisions, reopen wounds, and perpetuate underlying disputes,
as the South African and other recent examples may attest.
43
The prevalence of comfortable assumptions about what truth commis-
sions can accomplish likewise impacts scholarship. Indeed, if it is presumed
that the public airing of truth will lead discretely to the other goals of transi-
tional justice-reconciliation, justice, democratic reform, durable peace 44-
the relevant question for assessing truth commission success becomes the
quality or quantity of truth a commission is able to reveal. If we can only
design a truth commission's mandate and powers well enough, it is
imagined-enabling it to expose the most thorough or important truths of
the past-social norms can be reconstructed and social institutions rebuilt
so as to prevent a repetition of the past. Under this institutional design ap-
proach, scholarly assessments will tend to focus analysis on the jurisdic-
tional attributes associated with distinct commissions: 45 Does truth
commission X have the power of search and seizure, to compel witness
testimony, to demand national security documents, to grant amnesty in ex-
change for testimony? Did it allow for victim hearings and were they pub-
lic? Did it include institutional or thematic hearings, or was testimony
limited to written responses? How limited or expansive was the commis-
sion's substantive and temporal mandate? Each of these questions is impor-
tant and necessarily relevant, but they do not speak directly to long-term
preventative impact. 6 To do so, one must look not only at truth commission
powers, but, much more importantly, at what happens after a truth commis-
sion shuts its doors and releases its final report. How does broader society
engage with its outputs, and particularly with its recommendations?
A more humble view of what truth commissions can accomplish
would, by contrast, do two things. First, it would change the political
43. See, e.g., Ereshnee Naidu, Symbolic Reparations and Reconciliation: Lessons
from South Africa, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 251 (2012) (observing rising discontent
and worsening race relations); S. African Press Assoc., TRC Has Harmed Race Rela-
tions: Survey, July 27, 1998, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media/1998/
9807/s980727a.htm (survey of 2,500 people conducted by Market Research Africa in
1998 found that TRC had harmed state of race relations in South Africa, with only 18
percent saying race relations had not been worsened by hearings).
44. See Kritz, supra note 12, at 13.
45. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of
Truth Commissions, 72-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 123, 125 (2009) (associating
truth commission effectiveness with public hearings and media attention that garner
widespread public attention).
46. At the same time, they tend to cast the South African experience as the stan-
dard to emulate. As numerous observers have noted, that experience is not particularly
replicable in most transitional settings and hence should not be invoked as the inevitable
comparator. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 12, at 14.
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calculus of transitional justice implementation, shifting the onus of imple-
mentation away from temporary bodies with limited mandates toward a
more robust national effort that depends for its success on the comprehen-
sive engagement of civil society.4 7 Second, it would spotlight attention on a
very different set of assessment indicators for measuring truth commission
success. Those indicators would not focus on the nature or quality of truth
revealed by a truth commission's work, recognizing that such truth will
always be partial, incomplete, and selective. 48 Rather, they would focus on
how a transitional society organizes itself to respond to and engage with the
processes and outputs of a truth commission. That is, a concern about im-
pact and particularly prevention should lead observers to shift attention
from what happens within a truth commission to what happens in response
to it after its mandate ends. How do both government and civil society en-
gage with the broad policy recommendations officially put forward by a
truth commission to take forward the justice project?
Under this proposed approach three specific assessment indicators
would require systematic monitoring and assessment. Representing key pro-
cess, structural and outcome indicators, these include: (1) the density, distri-
bution and scope of domestic civil society groups organized around the
implementation process, (2) the institutional framework established by gov-
ernment to orchestrate the implementation process, including how that
framework incorporates civil society participation at both local and national
levels, and (3) the extent of implementation of a TRC's recommendations,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. These indicators, I argue, are better
able to assess the impact of a truth commission on the societal transforma-
tions necessary to prevent a repetition of past violence. They are thus partic-
ularly relevant for those concerned about impact and particularly
prevention.
II. CURRENT ASSESSMENT APPROACHES
As the fledgling transitional justice field has begun to mature and frac-
ture, a growing emphasis has been placed on identifying appropriate impact
assessment indicators to guide decision-making about what kinds of transi-
47. The need for this shift is not to suggest that acknowledgment of an "official
truth" is not important in its own right, nor that it is not related in key ways to promot-
ing social healing, national reconciliation, norm reconstruction, and institutional reform.
It is merely to recognize that acknowledgment, by itself, will not serve the larger ends
of societal transformation.
48. See, e.g., Mahmood Mamdani, Diminished Truth, in AFTER THE TRC: REFLEC-
TIONS ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (W. James & L. Van de
Vijvered eds., 2000).
[Vol. 19
Truth Commission Impact
tional justice mechanisms-or kinds of combinations and sequences of
them-to pursue.49 And, yet, none of the major methodological approaches
taken at present to assessing impact, especially with respect to truth com-
missions, appear to take the above considerations directly into account.
Rather, these approaches have tended to converge around four major meth-
odological lines of inquiry or measurement. I call these "Quantifiable
Truth," "Victim Perception," "Formal Political Rights," and "Redistributive
Development." The sections that follow describe each respectively. In par-
ticular, they highlight the major limitations of the four approaches for accu-
rately assessing the utility and impact of truth commissions as effective
mechanisms of transitional justice.
A. Quantifiable Truth
The first approach to assessment has been perhaps the most frequently
employed in the transitional justice literature. Dominating the "first wave"
of truth commission research, it has defined truth commission "success"
largely by how much "truth" a commission is able to reveal over its ten-
ure.50 The more or higher quality truth that is publicly clarified, it is pre-
sumed, the more "successful" the commission. Scholarship in this vein has
correspondingly tended to comprise single country case studies or small
"N" comparative analyses that focus, mostly descriptively, on the final de-
liverables or internal jurisdictional attributes of distinct commissions: the
scope of a body's mandate, the timeframe of its operation, the types of
abuses it can address, how many cases it has investigated, and what powers
of enforcement or compulsion it wields. 51 Particular strands, in turn, have
focused less on the nature of the truth produced than on how that truth was
49. Much of this literature has nonetheless focused on defending particular kinds
of transitional justice mechanisms. See, e.g., OLSEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16-25 (cate-
gorizing literature on the "success" of transitional justice mechanisms into four major
approaches: a maximalist approach, minimalist (or consequentialist) approach, moder-
ate approach, or holistic approach, each corresponding to a defense of trials, amnesties,
truth commissions, or combinations thereof, respectively). This Essay adopts a differ-
ent, more methodologically-focused categorization of the impact assessment literature.
50. See WEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 7-8, 23 (observing that early liter-
ature on truth commission success focused on descriptive assessments of "deliverables,"
including whether a final report was in fact released and publicized and the extent of the
report's substantive coverage).
51. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. For some of the earliest compara-
tive writings in this vein, see Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El
Salvador: A Report and Assessment," 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 656 (1994); Priscilla B. Hayner,
Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 597
(1994).
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publicized. Were hearings public or otherwise well covered by the media? 2
Was the commission's final report publicly released? If so, what steps were
taken, if any, to make it widely accessible? 53
Several common features have nonetheless characterized this scholar-
ship. One is that case studies have tended to focus on a small set of excep-
tional national experiences.5 4 As a result, their conclusions may result from
a biased sample, rendering them of limited relevance to other national ex-
periences and difficult, even dangerous, to generalize. 55 Another is that the
scope of inquiry in much of this literature has tended not to extend much
beyond the completion date of the commission's mandate or the release of
its final report.5 6 Given this limited time-frame, its capacity to assess a truth
commission's impact on broader societal changes or actual institutional re-
forms-indeed, anything exogenous to the truth commission itself-is
highly limited. 57 A third related characteristic is the literature's analytical
52. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 45, at 125.
53. See, e.g., Mary L. Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investiga-
tory Commissions in Latin America, 20 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 38 (1995) (suggesting
truth commissions unlikely to be successful unless they produce recommendations that
are publicized). Others have sought to combine the focus on deliverables, internal juris-
dictional attributes, and publicity. See B.M. Botha, "Truth Commissions and Their Con-
sequences for Legitimacy," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston (1998) (coding
truth commission as strong or weak based on four factors: resources (budget and num-
ber of commissioners and staff), thoroughness (number of cases investigated, scope of
mandate, length of work), credibility (societal representation of commissioners), and
publicity (final report released, public or televised hearings, media coverage)).
54. South Africa in particular has dominated the truth commission literature. Pris-
cilla Hayner characterizes the five strongest truth commissions to date as those of South
Africa, Guatemala, Peru, Timor-Leste, and Morocco. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at xv.
55. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 12, at 14 (noting dangers of overwhelming focus
on South Africa in literature); HAYNER, supra note 3, at 183 (underscoring conclusions
not necessarily transferable elsewhere).
56. See WtEBELHAus-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 8 (attributing this to fact that
much of the truth commission literature is written by former commissioners and staff or
other "members of the international human rights community, who usually move on to
the next hotspot shortly after the aftermath of the release of the commission's final
report").
57. See id. ("[A]t present, we still have little sense of the longer-term conse-
quences of conducting truth commissions."); David Backer, Cross-National Compara-
tive Analysis, in AsSESSING TJ IMPACT, supra note 2, at 23, 51 ("[A] great deal is
known about the literal mechanics of transitional justice processes, but far less is under-
stood about the resulting implications."). In this respect, Brahm highlights the impor-
tance of distinguishing between a truth commission's "success" (the degree to which if
fulfills its mandate) from its "impact (the social and political consequences of its exami-
nation of past human rights abuses). See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 23.
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weakness: Lacking a consistent and empirically-testable basis for assess-
ment across cases, its findings and conclusions have been largely impres-
sionistic or anecdotal, often reflecting the particular normative biases of the
researcher, as derived from a particular set of values or country-specific
experiences.5 8 More systematic cause-effect relationships and comparisons
of quantifiable impacts across a wide range of cases, "including societies in
which transitional justice has not been pursued,"59 have not been addressed.
Instead, attributions of commission effectiveness have tended to be based
on the mere conviction that "more" truth is good, and that the public revela-
tion of such truth positively impacts longer term reconciliation, peace, and
reform objectives.
From the perspective of impact assessment, several manifest difficul-
ties accompany the approach. The first is that truth, as a dynamic and dia-
logical social construct that tends toward political capture, cannot easily be
assessed in quantitative terms. Epistemologically, what is "more" truth?
Does it run deep or wide? Is "more" truth revealed when all cases of official
torture or narrowly-construed assaults on physical integrity rights are inves-
tigated or when a broader range of abuses-including structural or systemic
abuses against entire communities of victims6°-are addressed albeit less
exhaustively? Should truth discovery favor complexity or a simple story-
line? Who decides, and what broader narrative frames such discovery? In-
58. See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 8, 13 ("[V]ague concepts, ques-
tionable theorizing, and weak empirics have allowed many observers to draw conclu-
sions that support pre-existing normative convictions. Cause effect relationships have
often been asserted rather than empirically tested."). These value judgments often de-
rive from assessments about whether the truth commission fulfilled the "legal" obliga-
tions of the state under international human rights law or its "moral" obligations to
victims. Id. at 9-10.
59. OSKAR N. T. THOMS ET AL., CTR. FOR INT'L POL'Y STUDIES, THE EFFECTS OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS: A SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSTS AND PRACTITIONERS 5 (2008), available at http://
humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CIPSTransitionalJustice_- April2008.pdf (not-
ing insufficient evidence to support strong positive or negative claims for transitional
justice's impact on political violence, human rights and the rule of law). See also
WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 8 (observing tendency to give truth commis-
sions credit for developments more accurately attributed to other factors, conflating
correlation with causation).
60. See Madeleine Fullard, Dis-placing Race: The South African Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (TRC) and Interpretations of Violence, in RACE AND CITIZEN-
SHIP IN TRANSITION SERIES (2004), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/racism/
displacingrace.pdf (documenting how TRC systematically avoided addressing questions
of race discrimination and the structural violence that defined everyday life for non-
whites in apartheid South Africa in its truth-telling project).
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deed, whose truth is it, and how does that truth limit competing perspec-
tives? These definitional questions have increasingly been addressed in the
critical scholarship.
At the same time, the idea that "more" revealed truth (however de-
fined) leads to greater social stability, institutional reform and psychologi-
cal repair does not appear to be supported by the empirical data. There may
indeed even be a negative correlation between such ends, with official truth
clarification hardening adversarial positions, deepening social fissures, or
accentuating psychological pain. Accordingly, while scholarship focused on
quantifiable truth may provide important comparative and institutional de-
sign insights into the different ways that truth commissions are structured,
the diversity in their mandates, and how their work products are publicized,
it cannot tell us much, if anything, about whether the truth revealed-
whether narrow or robust, shallow or deep, focused on complexity or a
simple narrative story-line-has any measurable impact on behavioral, nor-
mative or institutional changes on the ground over the medium or long
term.
To measure these critical changes the researcher must extend her vi-
sion beyond the internal functions and operations of a truth commission to
look at how distinct social actors respond on the ground to those operations
and their outputs. That response is likely to change markedly with time and
to vary over spatial and cultural geography, given distinct inter-group and
regional experiences with violence, both vertically and horizontally. Social
responses are, moreover, likely to evolve dynamically with changing politi-
cal conditions and approaches to implementation, the relative activism of
peer groups and cross-national or intra-national learning processes, human
and financial resource availabilities, evolving issues of trust, and many
other organizational incentives or disincentives to mobilization. A longer-
term, more endogenous perspective is thus necessary for an accurate assess-
ment of impact.
B. Victim Perception
A second approach to assessment has sought to transcend some of the
above difficulties by turning its lens toward the actual targets of transitional
justice initiatives. It has focused not on how much "truth" is produced by a
transitional justice mechanism, but rather how that mechanism and its oper-
ations are perceived by the target audience. Using public perception as the
relevant measure of effectiveness, 6 a truth commission's "success" thus de-
61. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, at 24, 50-53.
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pends on whether the broader public views the body's work as sociologi-
cally legitimate and hence worthy of public adhesion and support.
62
This understanding of success derives from its proponents' priority at-
tention to democratic legitimacy theory and to norm reconstruction as the
primary driving goal of transitional justice. The effectiveness of a truth
commission in contributing to norm reconstruction will correspondingly de-
pend on the existence of at least two predicate conditions: whether a given
commission is able to attract the attention of its constituents and, most di-
rectly, whether its work product and processes are perceived as legitimate
among members of the mass public. 63 Only where perceptions of legitimacy
are high, it is understood, will social stakeholders view the institution's pro-
fessed norms against mass violence as meaningful and hence worthy of
internalization. Such norm internalization (by affected populations, perpe-
trators, and political elites alike) is the predicate condition upon which the
social reconstruction of norms against mass violence is built.64 Truth com-
mission success thus depends on it.
While no doubt adding importantly to the field, 65 this approach none-
theless likewise has its shortcomings. The first relates, again, to the
profound difficulties of measurement. In particular, results may vary mark-
edly depending on how questions are framed, how participants are selected,
and at what stage of the process a survey is conducted, given that public
62. Sociological legitimacy exists when "the relevant public regards [the institu-
tionl] as justified, appropriate or otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear
of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward." Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Legitimacy and
the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2005). See also Ian Hurd, Legitimacy
and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORGS. 379, 281 (1999) ("[L]egitimacy
... refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be
obeyed.").
63. See Gibson, supra note 45, at 125. See also Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, at
I 1 ("Effective norm reconstruction requires that societal stakeholders, particularly af-
flicted populations, perpetrators and political elites, view these new or revitalized norms
against mass violence as legitimate.") (emphasis in original).
64. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, at 12 ("This internalization will enable the
norms laid out by the transitional justice mechanism to take root fully, recreating the
moral fabric of a society recovering from mass violence."); id. at 67 (depicting relation-
ship in graphical form).
65. The approach is particularly useful for "design" questions at the front end of
transitional justice processes, and for ensuring continual public feedback and input into
questions of design modification moving forward, especially where international pres-
sure to adopt particular standardized mechanisms is strong.
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perceptions tend inevitably to evolve over the life of a transitional justice
body.66
Perceptions may likewise shift based on who administers the survey,
how it is introduced, or what cultural assumptions underlie particular ques-
tion sets.67 While scholars respond by underscoring the importance of sup-
plementing surveys, polling, and questionnaires with structured interviews
and extending them over time, these studies often suffer from similar selec-
tion biases. In South Africa, for example, one of the only nations in which
wide-scale individual-level victim studies have been conducted, 68 observers
come to radically different views about the TRC's "success" and public
legitimacy. For instance, while a national poll in 1998 found that fifty-seven
percent of those surveyed believed that the TRC had been good for the
country, 69 structured interviews conducted contemporaneously with more
limited numbers of direct victim constituencies found significant dissatis-
faction with the body.70 An additional survey found large majorities believ-
ing the TRC had in fact worsened race relations, with only eighteen percent
disagreeing. 71 The same incompatibilities in results have been documented
in other national contexts. 72
What conclusions are, then, to be drawn for legitimacy? Whose opin-
ions matter? Do some take priority? How do we take account of differences
in perception between organized and unorganized groups, urban and rural
communities, gender and age groups, and distinct types of victim popula-
tions, including those whose experienced harms were not addressed by the
66. See, e.g., Sarkin & Daly, supra note 30, nn. 48 (noting significant change in
societal beliefs about effectiveness of South African TRC as measured by country-wide
surveys from 1996 to 1998).
67. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Cultural Values and Authority Relations, PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y, & L. 1138, 1153 (2000).
68. See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 11 (noting almost universal disap-
pointment with truth commissions on the part of victims in South Africa).
69. See Gunnar Theissen, Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Toward
the TRC, in TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER?
191, 197 (Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van Der Merwe eds., 2008) (citing 1998
Human Science Research Council Poll).
70. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 48-49 (2001).
71. See S. African Press Assoc. Survey, supra note 43.
72. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, at 51 (noting inconsistent survey re-
sults regarding TRC in Sierra Leone, including fact that while nearly 60 percent respon-
dents believed TRC facilitated "reconciliation," only 44 percent believed people had a
positive attitude toward it).
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commission?73 Is a truth commission a success if public support was high
throughout its operations, but plummets at the stage of implementing rec-
ommendations, as the majority comes to see the body as a political white-
wash? Changing legitimacy perceptions over space and time thus present
significant assessment difficulties that require a different set of methodolog-
ical tools and supplementary measurement indicators.
A second limitation with the approach results from its arguable over-
emphasis on norm internalization as the key to social transformation, side-
lining other more concrete or measurable indicators of social change.
Perception data can thus lead scholars to conclude "effectiveness" of a tran-
sitional justice mechanism on the mere ground that society is broadly aware
of truth commission hearings or operations,74 or considers them abstractly
legitimate.75 Neither is sufficient to ensure that society, meaning the real
people who constitute it, have in fact effectively integrated those norms into
their daily routines, practices, identities and day-to-day interactions. Some
other set of supplementary assessment indicators is necessary to capture the
important process of how general norm legitimacy or acceptance leads in
fact to meaningful changes in on-the-ground behaviors, relationships, struc-
tural conditions, and institutional practices. Conclusions of effectiveness
will remain questionable if these broader structural, institutional and behav-
ioral changes are not somehow observed empirically and, importantly, can
causally be attributed in some degree to the work of the mechanism, rather
than some other broader set of factors.
C. Formal Political Rights
A third approach to impact assessment has turned to quantitative statis-
tical analysis to address some of these shortcomings, focusing on states'
relative levels of post-conflict protections for formal political rights. In par-
73. Compare, for example, Lisa Laplante, Negotiating Reparation Rights: The
Symbolic and Participatory Quotients, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 217 (2012) (docu-
menting significant dissatisfaction with government's reparations plan in Peru among
organized victim rights groups), with ICTJ & APRODEH, PERU: jCukANo SE HA
REPARADO EN NUESTRAS COMUNIDADES? (2011), <http://www.ictj.org/sites/default
files/ICTJ-Peru-Reparaciones-201 l-Espa%C3%B lol.pdf> (concluding that victim com-
munities that have received collective reparation are largely satisfied with the programs
implemented to date).
74. See Gibson, supra note 45, at 125 (suggesting key to effectiveness of South
African truth commission was its televised and otherwise broadly reported public
hearings).
75. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, 61, 63-67 (suggesting key to effectiveness
of transitional justice mechanisms is ensuring broad public input in their design, as
measured through perception studies and survey data).
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ticular, the approach has relied on increasingly sophisticated large-N cross-
national regression analyses in an effort to isolate and control for measura-
ble improvements in a transitional state's achievement of a limited set of
"democracy" and "human rights" indicators. By doing so, quantitative re-
searchers have aimed to rectify some of the deficiencies observed in the
more qualitative or perceptual case-based approaches addressed above.
As a methodological matter, the approach aspires to tackle more di-
rectly the typically undervalued problems of endogeneity and causation in
truth commission impact assessments: Is it the truth commission itself that
has caused distinct societal changes, or would those same changes have
occurred without the operation of a truth commission?76 Quantitative social
science researchers have correspondingly turned increasingly to two-stage
least squares (or simple bivariate) regression analyses in an effort to isolate
the impact of distinct transitional justice initiatives on the dependent vari-
ables of interest-most commonly, peace, human rights, and democracy. 77
The regression technique, it is noted, controls for the possibility that truth
commissions may be established in environments that are already condu-
cive to democracy and better human rights protection. 78
The approach has likewise sought to avoid the research difficulties as-
sociated with the largely "impressionistic, anecdotal" findings of other ap-
proaches, as well as the issue of non-uniformity in the standards that
underlie them.79 Both problems, it has been noted, have led to idiosyncratic
and contradictory conclusions that defy generalization and "empirically
grounded theory building. '80 By utilizing a set of quantitative metrics that
can be applied consistently across a large number of nations, the new ap-
proach, it is maintained, allows researchers to reach generalized conclusions
76. See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 17, 31, 137-38.
77. See id. at 130 ("To date, quantitative research that treats truth commissions as
independent variables has focused on three outcomes of interest: peace, human rights,
and democracy."). As Brahm notes, as of 2010 only one quantitative study of truth
commission effects on peace had been conducted. It found them to be largely irrelevant
for peace-building, but positively related to sustaining peace in countries that were al-
ready democratic. Id. (citing T.G. Lie et al., "Post-Conflict Justice and Sustainable
Peace," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191, Post Conflict Transitions
Working Paper No. 5 (2007)).
78. See id. at 138. "Measurement validity" nonetheless remains a major problem-
atic issue in all quantitative social science research, given the manifest difficulties of
representing complex social phenomena through quantitative indicators and the inability
to control for all relevant influencing factors.
79. Id. at 6.
80. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 25 (noting "field has [thus far] tended to rely on
wishful thinking rather than empirically grounded theory building").
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about the real-world impact of transitional justice initiatives on some of the
key objectives of transitional justice. 8'
In substantively determining which of these objectives to focus their
analyses on, quantitative "large N" researchers have, unsurprisingly, turned
to those that are most easily measured or for which well-respected global
quantitative datasets or indices already exist. 82 Four global datasets purport-
ing to measure "democracy" and "human rights" have been a particular
draw, justified on the ground that improvements in such metrics reflect cen-
tral objectives of transitional justice. Given the relative comprehensiveness
of their respective datasets, the Cingranelli and Richards Physical Integrity
Rights Index (CIRI-PHYSINT) and the Political Terror Scale (PTS) have
been relied upon most commonly to assess a nation's human rights record.
The similarly comprehensive Polity IV and Freedom House databases, in
turn, have been used to measure "democratic development. ' 83 The resulting
quantitative and empirically-based findings, it is contended, are more effec-
tive in assessing the real-world impacts of transitional justice initiatives
than the largely anecdotal findings associated with other approaches.
The results have been revelatory. In particular, two recent studies con-
clude that truth commissions do not appear to have any appreciable impact
on either democratic consolidation or improved human rights perform-
ance. 84 In fact, truth commissions may statistically correspond with worsen-
ing human rights records in the nations that deploy them. Such results raise
serious questions for the transitional justice community. The findings have
indeed led one group of researchers to conclude that truth commissions, at
least when pursued in isolation from trials and amnesties, provide no posi-
tive additive value to human rights or democracy in transitional contexts.8 5
The necessary implication is that they are not a cost-effective choice from
81. But see THOMS ET AL., supra note 59, at 54 (cautioning that trend toward
quantitative measures in impact assessments "only creates a patina of precision").
82. See WIEBELHAus-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 38 (describing reasons for
selection).
83. Less frequently, the UNDP Electoral Democracy Index and the World Bank's
Governance dataset (measuring "rule of law" progress) are likewise utilized.
84. See supra note 23. But see THOMS ET AL., supra note 59, at 31 (underscoring
that "existing empirical knowledge about the impacts of transitional justice is still very
limited, and does not support strong claims about the positive or negative effects of TJ
across cases") (emphasis in original).
85. See OLSEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 153-54 (concluding that "truth commis-
sions, when used alone, have a significant, negative effect [on democracy and human
rights]" and that "the most successful transitional justice projects for achieving stronger
democracies and human rights records will include trials and amnesty," with or without
truth commissions).
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the perspective of human rights and democracy, and should be pursued with
caution, if at all.8 6
Other researchers have come to more nuanced conclusions by combin-
ing the advantages of large-N statistical analysis with the detailed process-
tracing of small-N comparative research. Eric Wiebelhause-Brahm, for ex-
ample, concurs that quantitative statistical regression analyses demonstrate
that truth commissions have no meaningful effect on democratic outcomes
and actual negative impacts on human rights. He nonetheless considers
these outcomes in light of his own qualitative case-studies of a small sam-
ple of otherwise prominent national experiences, for which the statistical
findings do not hold.8 7 Such discrepancies, he concludes, highlight the need
for better causal tracing in qualitative national case studies to help identify
what makes certain experiences "exceptional." Truth commission expert
Priscilla Hayner agrees, noting that truth commission impact assessments
will continue to need to take qualitative, case-specific comparisons into ac-
count in order to ensure that contextual issues are effectively taken on board
in making comparisons and conclusions based on statistical data.88 It is
clear, then, that an additional set of intra-society indicators is necessary to
help identify what causes truth commissions to impact human rights and
democracy positively in some settings and negatively in others.
Other factors similarly urge caution in using such statistical impact
assessment approaches, at least in isolation from other methods. These con-
cerns derive in large measure from the biases built into the approach's base-
lines and the normative preferences of its favored datasets. As measures of
a nation's human rights record, for example, the CIRI-PHYSINT and PTS
indices limit their scope to a highly select set of physical integrity viola-
tions: extrajudicial killings, disappearance, torture, and political imprison-
ment.8 9 Their scores thus measure only one limited dimension of a nation's
86. The researchers do not conclude this outright, yet it is implicit in the conclu-
sion that favored outcomes are equally successful when trials and amnesties are com-
bined or sequenced "with or without truth commissions." Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
87. See WIEBELHAus-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 35-125 (discussing case studies of
South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, and Uganda).
88. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 26.
89. CIRI PHYSINT measures torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment
and disappearance, while PTS measures wrongful imprisonment and torture. See OLSEN
ET AL., supra note 4, at 136. Both datasets, moreover, are coded from annual reports on
human rights practices produced by Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of
State, and hence may incorporate the particular biases of these institutions (as well as
those of coders). At the same time, their scales are limited to nine and five points,
respectively, meaning that the gaps between scores may conceal more than they reveal.
For more on the problems associated with use of such quantitative datasets, see Emilie
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human rights record, and hence its transition. 90 Although researchers often
describe this focused perspective as part of the approach's "attractive-
ness," 91 its effect in practice is to misrecognize the lived reality of immense
numbers of victims of mass violence, who may find no improvement in
their own day-to-day situation despite formally improved PTS scores. More
directly, it leaves out much of what truth commissions are expected to do in
terms of addressing the underlying causes and consequences of mass vio-
lence. 92 The fact that so many past truth commissions have limited their
investigatory work to this narrow subset of human rights violations has in-
creasingly been criticized by victim populations for not addressing their real
day-to-day concerns and experiences; more recent commissions have corre-
spondingly taken a broader view.93 Relying on the CIRI and PTS datasets as
the exclusive metric for truth commission success in the area of human
rights is thus decidedly fraught.
As statistical measures of "democratic development," the Polity IV
and Freedom House databases are similarly problematic. Their scope is
largely limited to the formal and institutional dimensions of national-level
electoral democracy and related rules governing the formal political system:
who votes, who can be elected, and what are the constraints on executive
power. 94 These dimensions not only have not been central to a typical truth
M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Quali-
tative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POLITICS 360, 380-83 (2009).
90. Others question the very idea that human rights can be measured with a nu-
merical score. See THOMS ET AL., supra note 59, at 43 ("The notion of measuring com-
plex social phenomena such as 'respect for human rights' with a numerical scale is, for
many, a formalistic abstraction that defies common sense.").
91. WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 131.
92. See FREEMAN, supra note 10, at 18 (including this purpose in very definition
of a truth commission).
93. See, e.g., Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transi-
tion, 40 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 14-20 (2007) (describing efforts of certain more
recent truth commissions to expand attention toward economic and social rights viola-
tions); Dustin N. Sharp, Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth Commis-
sions and Beyond, in JUSTICE AND EcONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION (Dustin Sharp
ed., forthcoming 2013) (describing shift toward foregrounding of issues of economic
violence in the work of truth commissions in Chad, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ke-
nya, and East Timor).
94. Polity IV measures political competitiveness, the regulation of political partic-
ipation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints
on the executive. The Freedom House Project measures "political rights" and "civil
liberties"-the former including the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect
responsible representatives, while the latter considers freedom of expression, associa-
tional and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy. See OLSEN ET AL.,
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commission's mandate, but are generally determined at the constitutional
level or through negotiated political settlements before a truth commission
is established. 95 Both of these factors can explain why researchers would
find no causal relationship between truth commission operations and en-
hancements in these important but limited dimensions of democracy.
An even more critical concern lies in what these "democracy" indices
fail to measure. Indeed, in their baseline focus on the more formalistic na-
tional-level aspects of institutional democracy, they neglect many of the
more instrumental and perhaps critical components of active and localized
democracy, including the level of domestic civil society engagement in all
aspects of public affairs. Given the diversity of forms such engagement may
take, such assessment requires a distinctly more qualitative, or at least
multi-method, approach. At the same time, if purporting to measure the
actual causal links between truth commissions and expanded democratic
engagement, impact assessment techniques should presumably aim to mea-
sure the degree to which domestic civil society actors in fact invoke truth
commission processes and work products to promote enhanced engage-
ment. Such engagement must be measured not only at the national level but
also in terms of localized and place-based follow-up or extension initiatives
in a nation's diverse communities. The favored quantitative databases do
not, however, take these critical engagement considerations into account.
The limits of the chosen metrics are likewise apparent at their intersec-
tion. A large percentage of localized civil society and other stakeholder ini-
tiatives will indeed focus on peace-building activities that do not directly
relate to questions of torture, extrajudicial execution and other formal politi-
cal rights violations. Rather, they will encompass issues central to commu-
nity-based healing, livelihood improvements, relationship building, dispute
resolution, and the search for redistributive justice, including with respect to
access to productive resources like land, water, jobs, and education.96 The
supra note 4, at 135. For problems associated with the datasets in quantitative research,
see Hafner-Burton & Ron, supra note 89, at 383-86; Gerardo L. Munck & Jay
Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices,
35 COMP. POL. STUD. 5 (2002); Joe Foweraker & Roman Krznaric, Measuring Liberal
Democratic Performance: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique, 48 POL. STUD. 759
(2000). Freedom House data on civil and political rights are available online at http:/l
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=l. Polity IV democracy data are available
online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.
95. See WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, supra note 23, at 141.
96. Such initiatives may be especially prevalent in contexts where the footprint of
international "transitology" is soft. "Transitology" is a term used increasingly to de-
scribe and disparage the international transitional justice community and the standard-
ized tool-kit approach it tends to promote.
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focus on formal political rights thus belies a narrow, programmatic set of
assumptions about transitional justice that have been deeply normalized in
international justice work, yet do not necessarily correspond to the way that
rights and democracy are most prevalently experienced by victim communi-
ties on the ground.97
Correspondingly, while the "formal political rights" approach responds
in important ways to key deficits in other assessment approaches, its met-
rics are similarly deficient for a reliable accounting of real-world truth com-
mission impact. A more accurate and robust assessment picture will require
the deployment of additional sets of impact indicators. Such indicators must
focus not only on outcome and structural indicators-as important as they
are-but just as critically on process indicators, especially those related to
active civil society participation in implementation efforts at all levels of
community and social organization.
D. Redistributive Development
Though not yet fully developed in the research literature, a fourth as-
sessment approach has begun to emerge over the last several years. Like the
formal political rights approach, it endeavors to track empirically measura-
ble outcomes in the larger political economy as the basis for assessing im-
pact or success in the transitional justice field. It nevertheless aims to
expand the focus of impact assessment beyond the narrow set of physical
integrity and political rights violations typically privileged in the transi-
tional justice literature. At the same time, it seeks to move beyond the
field's traditional preoccupation with a highly individualized approach to
violations, responsibility, and reparation. Instead, the approach has sought
to turn analytical attention more squarely toward the nature, quality, and
impact of redistributive reforms that result from a nation's transitional jus-
tice initiatives.
97. See, e.g., Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Tran-
sitional Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J. L. & Soc'y 265, 273 (2008) ("'Transition', as
normally conceived within transitional justice theory, tends to involve a particular and
limited conception of democratization and democracy based on liberal and essentially
Western formulations of democracy.").
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Attention to this perspective is relatively new,98 particularly from a
quantitative vantage.99 Indeed, the dominant paradigm of transitional justice
emerging from the 1980s and 1990s has tended to sideline core economic
and social rights from its agenda, seeing them as mere background condi-
tions that can be addressed once democracy and rule of law is restored. I°°
As a result, truth commissions and other transitional justice initiatives have
not tended to consider these rights as central. Neither have the researchers
studying them.
The lack of attention to socio-economic marginalization and other
kinds of "economic violence" at the heart of past (and typically continuing)
violence in transitional societies has nonetheless led an increasing number
of commentators to call for greater attention to questions of distribution,
discrimination, and marginalization in transitional justice initiatives.',° In
calling for a greater focus on the conditions of exclusion that enabled the
commission of past crimes, and the power relationships that sustain and
drive violence, these voices have insisted that justice and reconciliation can-
not be achieved in any meaningful sense if the plunder, exploitation, dis-
placement, dispossession, and coerced marginalization that accompanied
mass violence is not directly addressed in the transitional justice process. A
98. See Dustin N. Sharp, Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of
Fourth Generation Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (forthcoming 2013)
(arguing that a new phase or "fourth generation" of transitional justice preoccupations
has arisen, characterized in part by an increasing willingness to grapple with those is-
sues that have historically sat at the periphery of transitional justice concerns, including
those related to economic and social rights).
99. See Hafner-Burton & Ron, supra note 89, at 365 (noting that "there are still no
widely agreed upon cross-national time-series measures for economic and social rights,
making it hard for quantitative scholars to gain much traction"); but see id. at 365 n.33
(recognizing limited use of two composite development indexes, and noting "[n]ew
initiatives are under way to build new measures"). One new measure is the SERF Index.
See Susan Randolph, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Terra Lawson-Remer, Economic and So-
cial Rights Fulfillment Index: Country Scores and Rankings, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 230 (2010).
100. See Paige Arthur, How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Concep-
tual History of Transitional Justice, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 321, 325-26, 340 (2009) (arguing
that because "transition to democracy" was the dominant normative lens through which
political change was viewed in the 1980s and 1990s, certain legal-institutional reform
measures (prosecutions, truth-telling, restitution, institutional reforms) were recognized
as legitimate "justice measures," while others-such as claims for distributive justice or
socioeconomic transformation-were sidelined).
101. See, e.g., RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE
SHADOWS OF WAR (2002); Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transi-
tion, supra note 93, at 1; Zanaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the 'Eco-
nomic' In Transitional Justice, 2 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266 (2008).
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small, but growing number of transitional justice initiatives are thus begin-
ning to take these critical distributive issues into account, particularly as
they relate to access to land and productive resources. The cases of Guate-
mala, Colombia, Kenya, South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile,
Peru, and Morocco are examples.
Scholars have thus begun to promote an emergent research agenda to
map these processes and their effects as a key part of assessing the impact
of transitional justice. While many do so under a broadened "restorative" or
"distributive justice" model, 102 others have promoted the idea of "trans-
formative reparations" to capture the importance of not merely seeking to
return victims to the status quo ante-a status quo that is often one of injus-
tice, vulnerability, and socially-enforced deprivation. 103 Rather, the aim
must be "to transform the relationships of subordination and social exclu-
sion that are at the root of the conflict meant to be overcome."'' 4
As a research agenda, this impact assessment approach is still in its
infancy. Increased efforts will, however, be made in both qualitative case-
based and quantitative statistical research to track the distributive conse-
quences of transitional justice programs and their causal effect on the enjoy-
ment of core economic, social and cultural rights by victim communities.
This includes comparative attention not only to how reparations payments
and other direct benefits policies are structured for individuals and commu-
nities, but also how truth commission reports and recommendations are fol-
lowed up on through local laws and policies related to land ownership,
housing construction and availability for displaced populations, employ-
ment and health care services, water and sanitation, and access to other vital
livelihood resources. 10 5 The success of a particular transitional justice
102. See, e.g., DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONS (Morten Bergsmo et al., eds.
2010).
103. See Rodrigo Uprimny & Maria Paula Saffon, Reparaciones Trans-
formadoras, Justicia Distributiva y Profundizacidn Democrdtica, in REPARAR EN CO-
LOMBIA: Los DILEMAS EN CONTEXTOS DE CONFLICTO, POBREZA Y EXCLUSION 31
(Catalina Dfaz et al. eds., 2009).
104. Maria Paula Saffon & Rodrigo Uprimny, Distributive Justice and the Restitu-
tion of Dispossessed Land in Colombia, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONS,
supra note 102, at 379, 390 (understanding reparations as an opportunity to effect dem-
ocratic transformations of societies, not merely as a way to deal with the suffering
caused by atrocities).
105. There has been growing attention in this regard to the links between eco-
nomic development and transitional justice, including the question of linking repara-
tions programs with development policies. See, e.g., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009).
The Peruvian TRC's experience with designing its proposed reparation program is in-
triguing in grappling, ultimately unsuccessfully, with these links. See Lisa Magarrell,
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mechanism can thus be assessed, at least in part, based on how it contrib-
utes to more equitable societal outcomes in each of these core development
areas. From a quantitative perspective, improved Gini coefficients, SERF
Index scores, land-to-person ratios, and rising percentages of the population
with reliable access to productive assets, quality food and health care ser-
vices, sources of potable water and sanitation, adequate housing and educa-
tional opportunities, and legal representation may all be important
indicators of success, at least to the extent they can be traced back in some
way to processes initiated through, or in response to, truth commission or
other transitional justice mechanisms. 106
Such an approach is critically needed in the literature, providing a
more robust and responsive picture of truth commission impact in a variety
of national settings. Efforts to track these outcome-based distributive or de-
velopmental metrics, both quantitatively through large-N statistical analyses
and qualitatively through case studies, may nevertheless attract many of the
same difficulties associated with prior approaches. These include, in partic-
ular, insufficient attention to causality, inconsistent or overly simplistic
standards, and lack of attention to the social and political processes that
bring such changes about in the first place. Thus, additional indicators seem
necessary to complete the picture of how to assess a truth commission or
other transitional justice mechanism's impact on achieving the core ends of
preventing a return to past violence, including the discrimination, marginal-
ization, and abuse that always underlies, drives, and constitutes it.
Reparations for Massive or Widespread Human Rights Violations: Sorting Out Claims
for Reparations and the Struggle for Social Justice, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 85 (2003); HAYNER, supra note 3, at 173-75.
106. As Hafner-Burton and Ron note, some scholars use two composite develop-
ment indexes to measure respect for economic and social rights: the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) and the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). The former is a
composite of a population's life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, gross enrollment
ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita in Purchasing
Power Parity dollars. The latter is a composite of national life expectancy at age one,
adult literacy, and infant mortality. There are nonetheless multiple problems with the
use of such datasets. These include not only problems of missing data and over-time
comparability (like the CIRI and PTS indices), but also the fact that they measure socio-
economic outcomes, rather than government efforts to fulfill social and economic rights,
and hence may miss critical issues of causality and agency. See Hafner-Burton & Ron,
supra note 89, at 365 n.33, 387. The SERF Index is a new quantitative measurement
tool that seeks to take government effort to fulfill the rights to food, education, health,
and decent work into account. See Randolph et al., supra note 99.
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III. A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA
As noted, each of the four above approaches provides important and
complementary insights into the impacts and functioning of distinct transi-
tional justice initiatives; each should continue to be pursued and cross-refer-
enced in increasingly sophisticated and multi-method research studies.
Nonetheless, each also fails to capture several key elements of truth com-
mission processes that seem critical for a full and meaningful assessment of
their success. In this part, I thus propose a new approach to impact assess-
ment-one which might be termed "Participatory Engagement"-that can
be used in combination and conversation with the above approaches to gain
fuller insight into truth commission success. Such an agenda, I argue, is
able to reflect not only the inherent limitations of transitional justice mecha-
nisms as short-term institutions, but captures the key purposes for which
they are created.
Under this proposed approach three specific assessment indicators
would require systematic monitoring and multi-method assessment. Let me
call them indicators 1, 2, and 3. Indicator 1, a process indicator, would
measure and map the density, distribution and scope of domestic civil soci-
ety groups organized around the implementation process. Indicator 2, a
structural indicator, would appraise the institutional framework established
by government to orchestrate the implementation process, including how
that framework incorporates civil society participation at both local and na-
tional levels. Indicator 3, an outcome indicator, would measure the extent of
implementation of a truth commission's recommendations, both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. These indicators, I argue, are critical for assessing
the impact of a truth commission on the societal transformations necessary
to prevent a repetition of past violence. 107
Several reasons compel this shift toward the broader social dynamics
and political processes of implementation. The first is the simple fact that
truth commissions are not designed to be implementation bodies. They are
short-term investigatory bodies with very limited aims and powers. 108 They
107. A much fuller explication of the details, complexities, and measurement
methodologies of these broad indicators is of course necessary, but beyond the scope of
this short Essay, the aim of which is simply to introduce and underscore the key impor-
tance of such indicators in impact assessment research.
108. This is true both in terms of its outputs and processes. A truth commission
can investigate only a small number of cases, exhume only certain mass grave sites, and
look at only particular sets of violations. The truth it is able to tell will thus always be
partial and selective. Likewise, truth commissions can only begin processes of social
reconciliation, which, to be meaningful, must occur through multiple and overlapping
processes, with broad social buy-in and participatory engagement.
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are tasked with investigating a defined set of past events or patterns of
abuse and presenting a public report on their findings and conclusions. 10 9
Those conclusions will generally identify steps and measures for other ac-
tors to take to achieve the various goals of transitional justice."I0 Meaning-
ful assessment of a truth commission's success or impact must then include
sustained attention to how those actors-and particularly those tasked with
leveraging them-engage with the commission's work and recommenda-
tions. Indicators I and 2 are designed to do this.
The second reason compelling this shift, and particularly its focus on
engagement with and implementation of truth commission recommenda-
tions, relates to the special role played by truth commissions in identifying
necessary reform measures and other mechanisms of societal redress in
transitional settings. Truth commissions are tasked with helping to under-
stand the underlying causes of serious human rights abuse. As such, they
generally are in close contact with many victims, understand the global pic-
ture of official abuses, have a good sense of the types of harms suffered,
and can design reform or reparations programs that will fit within a range of
other reform and recognition policies."' Ideally, they will, moreover, en-
gage in broad processes of public consultation with victim groups and other
civil society actors on the appropriate scope and content of relevant poli-
cies, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and responsiveness of proposed tran-
sitional measures."l 2 They may also take express account of the comparative
experiences and recommendations of other truth commissions that have
confronted similar challenges."l 3 As compared to other political actors in
109. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 14-15. See also FREEMAN, supra note 10, at 18
(definition of truth commission).
110. If those actors do not independently take up such measures, or otherwise are
leveraged to do so, little in the way of impact can be expected.
111. See Pablo de Grief, Introduction, in The HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra
note 5, at 1, 10-11 (emphasizing importance of both "internal" and "external coherence"
in the design of effective reparation programs)
112. See, e.g., Cristiin Correa, Julie Guillerot & Lisa Magarrell, Reparations and
Victim Participation: A Look at the Truth Commission Experience, in REPARATIONS FOR
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN
PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 385 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan
Stephens eds., 2009); HAYNER, supra note 3, at 192 (describing experience in Guate-
mala, in which commission held a public conference on its recommendations, with over
400 Guatemalans participating, including legislators and key civil society leaders from
across the political spectrum, and together they drafted long lists of proposed policy
recommendations).
113. In crafting its recommendations, the TRCK, for example, studied not only the
recommendations of prior truth commissions in Korea, but also those of foreign truth
commissions in an effort to ensure its own recommendations were "more objective and
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transitional settings, truth commissions are thus uniquely well-situated to
identify-or take the first stab at identifying-the particular programs, poli-
cies, relationships, and institutions that require reform or transformation in
a given society. It accordingly makes sense to focus on their recommenda-
tions as a starting point for ensuring that changes and dynamics are fostered
that can ensure against repetition of past abuses.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a shift toward the three imple-
mentation indicators highlighted above is compelled by the very ends of
transitional justice, and how those ends can most effectively be assessed on
an empirical basis. Though often referred to undifferentiatingly under the
expansive cover of "reconciliation,"' 14 those goals, I would argue, include
three distinct, but overlapping normative, behavioral, and institutional com-
ponents: (1) the reconstruction of social norms opposed to mass violence,
(2) the reestablishment of civic or social trust necessary for effective de-
mocracy, and (3) the actual entrenchment of legal, policy, and structural
reforms to safeguard against future abuse, including by addressing root
causes. All three of these core goals-norm reconstruction, civic reengage-
ment, and institutional-structural reform-are necessary for achieving the
ultimate end of transitional justice: the prevention of future violence and
abuse. Truth commissions correspondingly generally attempt to engage
each of them in crafting their recommendations.
Effective assessment of a truth commission's transitional justice im-
pact should then focus on how truth commissions contribute to these three
goals. My central claim is that the engagement and implementation indica-
tors proposed here (with all their measurement and methodological com-
plexities) 15 do a better job of assessing that contribution than do other
indicators more typically used to assess impact or success in the transitional
justice field. To illustrate why, some of the connections are sketched
below.
practically possible." Final Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, Republic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77, 78 (2012) (Mark Nathan &
Eon Joo Park, trans.).
114. See, e.g., RECONCILIATION(S), supra note 13, at 5, 12, 290 (highlighting elu-
siveness of definition of "reconciliation").
115. It is to be emphasized that no set of indicators can perfectly capture the im-
pacts of complex social phenomena and their causal determinants. My claim is simply
that these indicators reflect key features of truth commission-linked societal transforma-
tions that have been ignored or under-addressed in other impact-focused research ap-
proaches, and that a research agenda focused on them can contribute importantly to the
field.
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A. Reconstruction of Social Norms
Although admittedly of profound difficulty to observe empirically and
hence to measure, a primary goal of transitional justice is the successful
reconstruction of social norms opposed to mass violence.' 16 It is indeed the
orchestrated and systematic breakdown of such norms that allows otherwise
ordinary people within society to rationalize and hence engage in or tolerate
extraordinary violence and inhumanity toward members.' 17 Truth commis-
sions contribute to the reconstruction of norms of dignity and social protec-
tion in a number of ways. Most directly, through their very creation and
operation, truth commissions signify a normative break with the past. They
represent official acknowledgment that gross human rights abuses were per-
petrated or acquiesced in by public authorities and other social actors, and
that those gross abuses must be systematically acknowledged, condemned,
diagnosed, and prevented from recurring. Likewise, by focusing sustained
attention on the dignity, voice and redress of victim populations, truth com-
missions reinforce the normative authority of human rights, the importance
of social accountability, the need for institutional safeguards for individual
dignity and minority protection, and the requirement of official reparation
to make victims whole for harms suffered as a result of public miscon-
duct. 8 Their expressive contribution to the process of social transformation
is thus a key part of their appeal. 19
How precisely they make this contribution is, however, less well un-
derstood. While sociological institutionalism and constructivist norm theory
tend to attribute social change dynamics to the institutionalization of world
models and global scripts (such as those represented by truth commissions)
116. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26, at 3 (2010).
117. See generally Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating Against
Catastrophe, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 323 (2012) (underscoring role that professional ambition
unchecked by the restraining force of internalized moral norms can play in leading
"ordinary men" to tolerate and collaborate in systems of repression, brutality and
murder).
118. It may be for this reason that so many states adopt them as a form of reestab-
lishing "national legitimacy." See, e.g., Framework Act, supra note 40, art. I (creating
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea).
119. There is a substantial literature on the expressive functions of socio-legal
institutions, both national and international, in influencing public norms of appropriate
behavior. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punish-
ment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Crimi-
nal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2007).
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that influence and become internalized in local communities, 120 they are
notoriously bad at addressing the "how" of these process and agency ques-
tions. National polls and perception surveys similarly fail to address this
question, while they are additionally susceptible to methodological manipu-
lation, variable findings, and interpretive failures in capturing place-based
cultural meanings and expressive signals. Within this context, a comple-
mentary and more empirically observable metric for assessing whether and
how truth commissions in fact contribute to norm internalization and recon-
struction may be said to lie in indicator 1. Indeed, by tracking the extent to
which domestic civil society groups organize themselves to engage with a
truth commission's recommendations, indicator I is able to capture not only
the depth and breadth of social awareness around truth commission
processes and outcomes, but also, in large measure, the degree to which the
norms they represent have been internalized by domestic social actors. 12 1
This understanding follows from the basic behavioral premise that social
actors will not generally expend the time, resources, and energy to engage
in collective action around truth commission recommendations and their
implementation if they do not perceive the underlying norms as just, appro-
priate and legitimate.
122
120. See JW Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. OF Soc.
144, 145 (1997) (observing that "[wiorldwide models define and legitimate agendas for
local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and
local actors" and helping to explain the adoption of standardized processes and norms
across otherwise dramatically diverse contexts); John G. Ruggie, What Makes the
World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52
INT'L ORG. 855 (1998) (positing that interests and identities of individual actors are
socially constructed in important part through the proliferation of global norms or
shared cultural understandings).
121. See text accompanying supra notes 63-64. In this sense, it captures a third
criteria identified as necessary for truth commission effectiveness: its ability to engage
all of society in serious soul-searching around its own ills that make abuses possible,
and to elicit thereby a sense of public ownership in the process. As has been noted, this
"process is extremely difficult to do without the active participation of a fairly robust
civil society." Kritz, supra note 12, at 18 ("Otherwise, a country has merely a nice
history lesson, destined for the bookshelf.").
122. See generally Carol McClurg Mueller, Building Social Movement Theory, in
FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 3 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Muel-
ler eds., 1992) (tracing developments in social movement theory away from resource
mobilization theory toward a resurgent social psychology of social movements);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (emphasiz-
ing importance of norm legitimacy for promoting compliance with laws and
institutions).
Of course, this premise can be challenged. In particular, social actors may invoke
externally-favored norms for instrumental ends alone, especially when tied to funding
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As a matter of theory, such an approach likewise serves to avoid some
of the dangers associated with social constructivist thought and other accul-
turation-based models of social change. As noted, such scholarship tends to
focus on the proliferation of global norms or shared cultural scripts-such
as those expressed by truth commissions-looking at how identities and
interests of individual or group actors are socially constructed by them.1
23
Serious shortcomings can nonetheless result when ideational factors be-
come the exclusive or near exclusive focus of policy analysis or regime
design, failing to take more explicit account of the actual mechanics of and
actors involved in effectuating social change. 124 In particular, by overem-
phasizing normative orthodoxy and institutional isomorphism (e.g., a set
truth commission script or checklist of final policy recommendations), see-
ing success in their formal uptake, attention can be diverted from what is
actually happening (or not happening) on the ground. 125 These actions may
include strategically calculated and formalistic uptake practices, extensively
described in the literature on "decoupling" and "creative compliance." At-
tention may likewise be diverted from "strategies of resistance" used by
elites wishing to avoid real change. In either case, suboptimal localized im-
resources. It is accordingly important to take the range of civil society groups, as well as
their distinct identities and funding sources, into account when surveying the actors
organized around the implementation or follow-up process (indicator 1). Given the limi-
tations of both victim perception studies and mobilization dynamics as perfect proxies
for norm internalization, the two methodologies should be used together where possible.
In all events, indicator I remains a key measure of civic reengagement, a complemen-
tary goal of transitional justice that is decidedly easier to operationalize, observe empiri-
cally, and hence to assess methodologically. See Part III(B) infra.
123. See Ruggie, supra note 120; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influ-
ence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621
(2004).
124. See Tara J. Melish & Errol Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and Partici-
pate: 'New Governance' Lessons for the Ruggie Framework, in THE UN GUIDING PRIN-
CIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 303,
311 (Radu Mares ed., 2012) (describing such limitations in the business and human
rights context).
125. See Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Re-
flections, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 275, 276 (2008) (criticizing the standardization of transi-
tional justice as a global project); INT'L CRISIS GRP., LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE:
REBUILDING FAILED STATES, AFRICA REPORT No. 87, at 9 (2004) (criticizing mechanis-
tic "operational checklist" approach to postconflict peacebuilding in which the interna-
tional community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series
of initiatives).
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plementation or superficial institutional reform efforts may result, even
where external observers claim "success." 126
At the same time, by embracing an understanding of systemic transfor-
mation that flows primarily from "higher" normative scripts to "lower" in-
dividual actors, the important ways that transitional justice norms are
constituted and reconstituted from below can be overlooked.1 27 By contrast,
an approach that focuses on how society organizes itself, both locally and
nationally, to leverage societal transformation through truth commission
processes may be able to tell us far more about how norms, behaviors, and
identities are in fact constituted and reconstituted in transitional settings.128
The proposed indicators, especially indicator 1 and its relationship to in-
dicators 2 and 3, are essential to this end.
B. Reestablishing Civic Trust
A second major goal of transitional justice is the reestablishment of the
civic trust necessary for effective democracy. It can likewise be empirically
assessed by reference to indicators 1 and 2. By focusing on organized do-
mestic civil society's engagement with a truth commission's recommenda-
tions and the state's follow-up structures for implementation, both
indicators reflect renewed forms of social and civic engagement, signaling
key attitudinal and behavioral changes on the part of government and do-
mestic civil society alike. Both are necessary for deepening democracy and
rebuilding deep social trust. 129 Indeed, mass violence has the effect of undo-
ing the civic and social trust necessary for effective democracy, both verti-
126. See Melish & Meidinger, supra note 124, at 311-312.
127. Id. at 313.
128. The upshot of this approach may be that truth commissions cannot be effec-
tive without a fairly robust civil society, a proposition that I am inclined to support. See
Kritz, supra note 12, at 18.
129. In this sense, this Special Issue takes a different approach to civil society
engagement with the state than other recent scholarship on the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK). In particular, the only other major work pub-
lished in English on the commission takes a particularly critical approach to the TRCK
as an epistemological project, questioning the ultimate meaning, purpose and possible
subordination of the TRCK's goals to the power of the state. It wonders, therefore,
whether a state-sponsored truth commission can ever achieve the goals of truth and
reconciliation. See Special 2010 issue of Critical Asian Studies, which will be pub-
lished later this year as a book titled Truth and Reconciliation in the Republic of Korea:
Between the Present and Future of the Korean Wars. This Special Issue takes a differ-
ent approach, while maintaining a critical focus. It understands direct and sustained
civic engagement with state and social institutions as a sine qua non of transitional
justice, and a key indicator of a truth commission's success.
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cally (between state and citizen) and horizontally (between communities). It
turns victim communities inward, a process that can keep them marginal-
ized, isolated, and hence prone to both continued abuse and even
extremism.130
A major ambition of transitional justice is thus to bring all groups back
into the fold, deepening participatory democracy and ensuring that all
groups feel safe expressing their views, interests, and opinions in public
fora, at both local and national levels. It may be recognized in this latter
regard that a majority of transitional justice initiatives may remain local and
community-based at the early stages of transition, especially in contexts
characterized by the absence of an effective state, continuing violence, or
deep social divisions. Such a reality should not, however, counsel against
efforts to ensure that national-level orchestrating processes are in place to
facilitate cross-project learning, linking, and scaling up, as appropriate.
These soft engagements can create new spaces for building trust across sec-
tors and communities, facilitating exchanges and interchanges between
groups that might not otherwise interact.
It merits special emphasis that the goal of reestablishing civic trust is
separate from reconciliation in the sense of forgiveness. It reflects a willing-
ness of former adversaries to engage each other directly in sustained demo-
cratic discourse without threat or fear of retaliatory violence or other abuse
of power.131 It is in essence a requirement for rights-based democratic gov-
ernance. Many societies in fact reject any concept of reconciliation that
goes beyond this basic civic goal, disavowing that forgiveness is possible in
transitional settings, or even a worthy goal of transitional justice. 132
130. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do (2001).
131. In Chile, for example, the director of the truth commission's follow-up body
defines reconciliation as "respecting the rules of the democratic game. There is a civi-
lized dialogue between the government and opposition, and no sector wants to take over
anti-democratically." HAYNER, supra note 3, at 186. See also Ron Dudai & Hillel Co-
hen, Dealing with the Past when the Conflict Is Still Present: Civil Society Truth-Seek-
ing Initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in LOCALIZING TJ, supra note 9, at
228, 235-42 (mapping local initiatives among small groups of Palestinians and Israelis
aimed at recognizing, understanding, and taking responsibility for past abuses on both
sides of the conflict, and emphasizing the indispensability of such initiatives for moving
beyond opposing "meta narratives" of exclusive victimhood and collective denial of the
other side's suffering, which function to inhibit any political compromise from being
reached).
132. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 187-188 (highlighting example of Argentina,
where strong resistance exists to the very idea that reconciliation in the sense of forgive-
ness is either possible or even a worthy goal).
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Indicators I and 2 reflect these goals with respect to truth commission
processes. They seek to map and measure how effectively truth commission
processes and outputs are used by domestic social actors to deepen demo-
cratic engagement around the implementation of identified reforms. Such
processes must come both "from above" and "from below." Indicator 1
measures the former, reflecting the degree to which distinct domestic civil
society actors feel safe and empowered enough to engage directly with gov-
ernment and other stakeholders in the implementation process. Indicator 2,
by contrast, measures the government's commitment to renewing civic en-
gagement through the truth commission process, and setting the foundation
for maintaining it thereafter. It understands that governments should estab-
lish some kind of institutional framework for facilitating implementation
and orchestrating the contributions and engagements of all stakeholders
within society, supporting and encouraging their active participation, inno-
vative ideas, and creative entrepreneurship. Such frameworks should not
seek to centralize processes, but rather to understand, support, link, and not
undermine them. When structured in this way, their very existence can have
important "symbolic" and "participatory" elements that can significantly
aid reform efforts. 33
C. Institutional Reform
Finally, indicator 3 aims to track a third major goal of transitional jus-
tice: institutional and structural reform. It is indeed difficult to conclude that
a transitional justice project is successful if the basic legal architecture and
institutional structures, policies, and relationships that existed during mass
violence remain unchanged. Correspondingly, truth commissions invariably
spotlight attention in their reports and recommendations on the laws, insti-
tutions, policies, and practices that allowed unrestrained violence and sys-
tematic human rights abuses to take place, calling for their reform. Indicator
3 would measure the extent of implementation of these critical recommen-
dations, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In many cases, especially
where official recommendations were framed vaguely or proposed without
programmatic detail, the metric might extend further to consider broadly
supported civil society proposals that directly draw from or extend the main
objectives or ambitions of official recommendations.
Such measurement and tracking is essential. Indeed, where a truth
commission's recommendations are not implemented or related institutional
reforms put in place, a society not only remains vulnerable to a slippage
133. See generally Laplante, supra note 73 (emphasizing importance of "sym-
bolic" and "participatory quotients" in economic reparations plans).
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into past conduct or a resurgence of norms tolerating mass violence, but
will likely also feel profoundly let down by, and even resentful of, the tran-
sitional justice project, as the South African and other examples attest. In
this regard, indicator 3, as an outcome measure, is likewise necessary to
avoid results that over-privilege process or formal structure. A careful bal-
ance between process, structure, and outcome metrics is indeed critical in
impact assessments. Consider, for instance, a domestic civil society that is
well organized and broadly engaged in pushing for implementation of a
truth commission's recommendations. Consider, too, that the government
has created a formal follow-up body to oversee the implementation process.
Is the truth commission a success? Such a claim is difficult to make, I
would argue, if progress is not likewise being made in the actual implemen-
tation of reform proposals and commission recommendations.
The goals of norm reconstruction, civic trust, and actual implementa-
tion of the institutional and social reforms recommended by truth commis-
sions are, in this sense, integrally and indelibly related in transitional justice
work. As Ereshnee Naidu underscores in her contribution on South Africa,
it is not only true that one can expect little in the way of civic reengagement
or policy reform if society remains unaware of or unconvinced by a truth
commission's work. Rather, it is equally true that a failure to implement
truth commission recommendations will undermine a truth commission's
legitimacy, the social norms it represents, and the civic trust it hopes to
rebuild. 134 Close attention to this latter indicator is thus imperative for com-
posing a meaningful assessment of a truth commission's impact.
In sum, the goals of norm reconstruction, civic trust, and institutional-
structural reform go hand-in-hand (in-hand) in the quest for prevention. In
assessing truth commission impact, each must therefore be closely tracked.
The indicators proposed here aim to do that, and to do so in an empirically
measurable way. Indeed, the ultimate purposes of transitional justice mech-
anisms are not to expose a given number of truths or put x number of perpe-
trators in jail. Rather, they are to change social and institutional dynamics,
deepening democracy and entrenching human rights protections, so as to
prevent the repetition of grave violence and human suffering.
While the research agenda proposed here is not a panacea to the
problems identified in other assessment approaches, it provides a critical
and complementary perspective that can significantly thicken our under-
standing of the conditions under which truth commission impact can be
maximized.
134. Naidu, supra note 43, at 251.
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD
As noted, the frequency by which truth commissions are being
deployed by global actors is increasing. At least twenty new truth commis-
sions were created in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the same
number created over the entire prior quarter century. 135 By 2010, a wide
range of diverse countries, including Canada, Ecuador, Kenya, Mauritius,
the Solomon Islands, South Korea, and Togo, all had actively operating
truth commissions. Liberia, meanwhile, had just concluded its truth com-
mission, while Brazil and Nepal were drafting terms of reference for theirs,
and a half dozen more countries were in serious discussion or planning
toward the creation of a truth commission. 136 With active hostilities still
raging, hundreds of delegates prepared to gather in early 2013 to make tran-
sitional justice plans for a post-Assad Syria, including discussions for the
possible creation of a truth commission. 137
Given this growing regularization in the global use of truth commis-
sions, it is particularly urgent to ensure that the deployment of such bodies
is in fact contributing to the primary goals of transitional justice. This Essay
has considered prevention of repetition to be the overarching goal, a com-
plex objective that requires concrete attention to how social actors incorpo-
rate human rights norms into their everyday practices and behaviors,
reengage with one another in civic life and social problem-solving, and in-
stitutionalize key policy and structural reforms. Current impact assessment
approaches, nevertheless, do not tend to take these critical components, and
particularly their intersections, into direct methodological account in their
research programs.
The indicators and research agenda proposed here help to fill this gap.
Introducing new assessment variables, they do so by turning policy atten-
tion squarely toward the social dynamics, institutions, and processes
through which social stakeholders contribute to truth commission follow-on
initiatives and recommendation implementation efforts. Although measure-
ment of the proposed indicators will require the multi-method use of quali-
tative case studies, small-N comparative research, large-N quantitative
135. See HAYNER, supra note 3, at 6. Five of these were inaugurated in 2009
alone, the largest number to date in any one year. Id.
136. See id.
137. Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Preparing for Justice in a Post-Assad
Syria, http://ictj.org/news/preparing-justice-post-assad-syria (discussing international
conference "Transitional Justice in Syria: Accountability and Reconciliation," bringing
together Syrian political opposition leaders, Syrian religious and minority leaders, fami-
lies of victims, as well as judges, lawyers, and human rights activists).
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statistical analysis, and victim perception studies, 138 the indicators advert in
a direction different from current approaches most commonly used in the
field. In particular, they seek to shine a light on the who and how of local-
ized transformative change in transitional societies: Who are the domestic
social actors that are mobilizing as change agents, and what are the levers in
society that they are seeking to pull, successfully or unsuccessfully? By
spotlighting attention on such actors and processes, a great deal may be
accomplished. Three programmatic advantages may be highlighted in
particular.
First, there is growing recognition among transitional justice scholars
and practitioners of the dangers associated with top-down approaches and
off-the-shelf "justice" initiatives for which victims are passive recipients,
feeling no local ownership or sense of relevance to their day-to-day lives. 39
Although such approaches are conceptually inconsistent with basic devel-
opment thinking and the participatory norms of human rights law-and
may engender stinging indictments of neocolonial intervention and massive
resource waste-they nonetheless persist in the operational programs of
many international agencies and funders "doing" transitional justice. These
funders and agencies often lack deep knowledge of what is happening lo-
cally, or, where local projects become known, may seek to adapt indigenous
initiatives into financeable projects that more closely resemble the standard-
ized forms with which they are most familiar and comfortable. 40
The research agenda proposed here can assist in reversing this dy-
namic by refocusing a lens more directly and systematically on the agency,
values, and priorities of local actors: What, specifically, are distinct and
methodologically disaggregated groups of domestic actors (with and with-
out international project funding) doing locally, how are they doing it, and
toward what ends? Indeed, a tracking of localized civil society initiatives
can enable critical information to be gathered about what matters to local
communities, how they envision solutions and the contributions of other
stakeholders, and what obstacles and opportunities they face on the ground
in promoting-and defining for themselves-the objectives of transitional
138. In contrast to the "victim perception approach" discussed in Part II.B supra,
the "participatory engagement" approach would tend to use victim perception studies
not primarily as a measure of norm reconstruction/internalization, but rather as one of
several methods to measure the quality of implementation efforts (indicator 3).
139. See, e.g., supra note 9.
140. See generally Lars Waldorf, "Like Jews Waiting for Jesus": Posthumous
Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in LOCALIZING TJ, supra note 9, at 183 (discussing
transformation of Rwandan gacaca).
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justice.' 4' It can thus facilitate deep social and institutional learning about
how best to support, and not undermine, such actors and processes. Without
proper attention to these dynamics, important engagement initiatives may
be rendered invisible to the mainstream transitional justice lens. A blessing
perhaps in some circumstances, 142 in others it may mean that small, iso-
lated, but innovative and locally-owned initiatives falter for lack of opportu-
nities to link with and learn from other key initiatives in broader society.
The research focus thus offers the potential for enhanced linkage, learning,
and scaling up, where appropriate. 143 It may thereby serve to improve local
responsiveness, relevance, and on-the-ground impact.
Second, the analytical shift toward a participation-based focus on im-
plementation has the potential to better shape stakeholder incentives in sup-
port of needed reforms. By closely tracking the proposed indicators and
publicizing the results, a spotlight can be shone on comparative best and
worst practices in promoting deep participatory engagement in transitional
justice decisionmaking and implementation. Policies can thus be crafted
and supported, particularly through the introduction of hard and soft incen-
tive systems, to help strengthen the hand of community-based actors seek-
ing to use truth commission processes to implement meaningful on-the-
ground changes. Such systems might include truth commission score cards
or rating systems, in which ranks were allotted based on how well govern-
ments scored on each of the proposed indicators. Such exposure would shift
political incentives toward participatory reform in important ways, espe-
cially if international aid or assistance were tied in some way to progress on
each of the three metrics, particularly indicator 3.144 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, domestic rating or ranking systems could be developed for individual
141. Despite prominent rhetorical attention to the importance of adhering to local
priorities and definitional understandings, international transitional justice scholars and
practitioners have demonstrated remarkable resistance to the idea of expanding the field
beyond traditional categories of activities, such as rule of law, criminal prosecutions,
truth, and demobilization and reintegration of combatants. This is particularly true
where economic and social fights or issues of structural violence are proposed.
142. See Arriaza & Roht-Arraiza, supra note 34, at 164 (pondering whether spon-
taneous, culturally-specific and local-level initiatives "lose their value if 'programmed'
or even encouraged by governments or international actors").
143. See id. at 166 (concluding that "[w]ithout the building blocks carefully un-
derstood and differentiated, larger-scale attempts at social reconstruction will surely
crumble").
144. See Kritz, supra note 12, at 18 (advocating tying donor aid to improved im-
plementation of truth commission recommendations); HAYNER, supra note 3, at 191,
193 (noting key role of international community in pressing Salvadoran authorities to
implement truth commission recommendations, and advocating linking international as-
sistance with implementation of domestic truth commission recommendations).
2012]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
agencies or politicians with direct implementation responsibilities, allowing
local actors to better leverage publicity and public action to alter the incen-
tive systems they face in following through on recommended reforms. Con-
tinual feed-back loops would nonetheless need to be ensured in such
systems, permitting local input into and ownership of indicator assessments,
scores, and ranks. 145
Third, a participation-based implementation agenda can yield impor-
tant reference points for questions of institutional design and sequencing
strategy. An understanding of the proposed impact indicators as key to truth
commission success would, for example, foreground the importance of
building participatory follow-on and orchestration bodies into the initial de-
sign of truth commission processes. Such a design shift would help to en-
sure that expectations about what a truth commission can itself deliver are
kept in check, redirecting the primary focus of assessment initiatives to the
effectiveness of implementation and the quality and distribution of follow-
on activities across distinct segments of society. At the same time, findings
from the assessment approach may convey important information about
when a comprehensively mandated truth commission is in fact an appropri-
ate response mechanism in times of transition. It has been suggested in this
regard that a truth commission should be established only where a moder-
ately robust civil society remains intact at the time of its creation. 146 Other-
wise, a narrower truth commission, styled along the lines of a research
initiative or other top-down initiative, might be the better option, 147 at least
until civil society is more firmly positioned to take on the responsibilities of
leveraging comprehensive follow-up. Where domestic civil society organi-
zations remain active and engaged, nevertheless, participatory engagement
with truth commission follow-on initiatives should be recognized as a key
driver and objective of truth commission impact assessment.
In closing this special symposium issue on the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK), a couple of conclusions for
the TRCK process may be highlighted. As indicated in the opening essay, 148
145. See generally Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation, supra note 35 (dis-
cussing misuses of competitive incentive systems in administrative regulation, particu-
larly through the top-down selection of performance-based indicators and targets that
fail to reflect local needs and improved dignitary outcomes).
146. See Kritz, supra note 12, at 18.
147. See id.
148. Tara J. Melish, Implementing Truth and Reconciliation: Comparative Les-
sons for the Republic of Korea, 19 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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virtually all contributions to this special issue have highlighted the impor-
tance of civil society engagement and the creation of a permanent follow-up
body to ensure that truth commission recommendations are indeed imple-
mented in practice. It is important to always keep present in this respect that
implementation is not a responsibility of government only. It is fundamen-
tally a responsibility of all social stakeholders, responsibly supported by the
international community and other human rights actors across the globe. 149
Measurement and assessment of the indicators proposed here can assist this
process, helping to ensure the availability of accountability structures for
failures to act or for failures to ensure broad civil society participation in
implementation efforts.
We hope this special issue contributes to the process of encouraging
broad sets of stakeholders in South Korea to engage the TRCK's final rec-
ommendations, the government's follow-up body, and creative follow-on
initiatives throughout society. Only through such broad participation-based
implementation efforts, we contend, can enduring progress be made in en-
suring that atrocities like those that befell the nation over the last century
never have an opportunity structure in which they can reoccur. The partici-
pation-based implementation agenda proposed here supports this end.
149. Although the focus of transitional justice efforts should always remain on
domestic agency and process, it may be normatively useful in this latter regard to pro-
gressively strengthen linkages between truth commission follow-up processes and the
increasingly prominent subsidiarity-based concept of the "responsibility to protect" in
international law, particularly its under-theorized and under-implemented responsibili-
ties to "prevent" and to "rebuild." See Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention
to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703 (2006) (noting former includes
duty to address "both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other
man-made crises putting populations at risk," while the latter requires providing "full
assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert").
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